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HUMAN NATURES1
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Ethnological interpretations being mostly comments on anecdotes, I hope to be 
forgiven if I begin this lecture with a small story.2 It comes from Father Emile Kemlin, 
a missionary who lived among the Reungao of the Highlands of Central Vietnam dur-
ing the first decade of the 20th century, and it refers to a woman named Oih.
One evening, as Oih was pounding rice on the veranda of her house, a tiger was strug-
gling nearby, choked by a bone which had remained stuck in his throat. In one of the 
huge leaps that he made to get rid of the bone, the tiger reached the veranda. Struck by 
fear, Oih dropped her pestle which fell on the tiger’s head. The tiger was so taken aback 
that he spat out the bone. He went away happily. During the night, the woman saw the 
tiger in a dream. ‘We will enter into a friendship from father to daughter’ said he. ‘I do 
not dare. Who would be bold enough to pretend to such a bargain?’ – ‘On the contrary, 
it is I who is afraid of suffering a rebuttal.’ Next morning, while Oih was in the forest, 
she met the tiger again, but in the flesh; he was carrying a huge boar. As soon as the tiger 
saw Oih, he unloaded his prey, cut it in two pieces, threw one to the woman and went on 
with the other half. This was not the only time when Oih was treated to such remnants 
1  Publicat originalment a Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2009) 17, 2 pp. 145–157, i reproduït amb 
el permís de John Wiley and Sons Publishers.
2  This article is a revised version of the inaugural lecture I delivered on 26 August 2008, at the 10th Biennial 
Conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists in Ljubljana, Slovenia; my warmest thanks go to the 
President of the EASA, Professor Shalini Randeria, to the Head of the Local Organising Committee, Professor Rajko 
Muršič, and to the members of the EASA Executive Committee who invited me to speak and who made my stay in 
Ljubljana memorable and pleasurable.
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for, from this day on, she only had to go to the forest to find pieces of deer or roe that her 
adoptive father left for her.3
Father Kemlin was a keen observer and his ethnographical writings on the Reun-
gao, whose language he spoke well, are still a trustworthy reference. He thus comments 
that the agreement passed between Oih and the tiger is a covenant of the type krao con 
b˘a, one of the various kinds of formal alliance which the Reungao can pass with hu-
mans and non-humans, each of them implying specific obligation for both parties. The 
Reungao are in no way exceptional in that respect: in many parts of the world, peoples 
nowadays commonly ascribe this kind of human-like behaviour to animals and plants. 
To take only recent Amazonian cases, the Makuna of Colombia say that tapirs paint 
their body with annatto to dance and that peccaries play the trump during their rituals, 
while the Wari’ of Brazil state that the peccary prepares manioc beer and that the jaguar 
brings his prey back home for his wife to cook.4 In all instances, these events are said to 
take place nowadays, not in a distant mythical past.
Ever since it emerged as an autonomous science, social anthropology has been rath-
er embarrassed by statements of this kind. It could even be said that it was born largely 
as an attempt to bring a rational answer to the logical scandal brought about by exotic 
forms of thought in which a neat divide between humans and non-humans did not 
appear to be neatly established. Many ingenious explanations were put forward to ac-
count for the apparent irrationality of these statements. For instance, that the principle 
of non-contradiction was ignored in non-literate societies, thus allowing their mem-
bers to disregard empirical experience and to postulate mystical continuities between 
humans and natural kinds.5 However, we know now that logical reasoning is not a 
privilege of the West or of the Chinese and Hindu reflexive traditions, as is made clear, 
for instance, by the use of syllogistic argumentations in Melanesian disputes about 
land tenure.6 Still another solution was to treat statements attributing human disposi-
tions to non-humans as belonging to the genre of metaphor; they would amount to a 
3  E. Kemlin (1999) Les Reungao. Rites agraires, songes et alliances: une société proto-indochinoise du Viêt Nam au début 
du XXe siècle; textes réunis et présentés par Pierre Le Roux. Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient, Collection réimpressions 
no. 11, p. 254, my translation.
4  For the Makuna, see Kaj Århem (1990) “Ecosofía Makuna”, in François Correa (ed.), La selva humanizada. 
Ecología alternativa en el Trópico húmedo colombiano, Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología, pp. 105–122. For the 
Wari’, see Aparecida Vilaça (1992) Comendo como gente: formas do canibalismo wari’, Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ, pp. 
55-63.
5  Notoriously, of course, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl; for instance, in Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures 
(1910. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, p. 79).
6  E. Hutchins (1980) Culture and inference: a Trobriand case study. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.
Human natures 13
mere rhetorical device similar to those that European fables employ when they portray 
animals as humanlike. But these peoples to whom such a liberal use of metaphors is 
ascribed know perfectly well the difference between a figurative and a literal statement, 
even when the latter appear to us irrational. As Dan Sperber pointed out, the Dorzé of 
Ethiopia distinguish unambiguously between saying that a brave warrior is a lion and 
saying of the leopard that he is Christian and that he respects the fasts of the Coptic 
rite: nobody pretends that the warrior has a mane, while the Christianity of the leopard 
is seen by the Dorzé as an undisputable fact since he does not eat the animals that he 
kills on fasting days.7
However, the most common and the oldest anthropological explanation of the kind 
of stories that the Reungao, the Makuna, the Wari’ or the Dorzé tell about animals is 
that these express a general tendency of humankind to anthropocentric projection. If 
certain cultures transgress the boundaries between humanity and animality, it would 
be because of a propensity to interpret phenomena and behaviour observable in their 
natural environment by endowing non-humans with qualities that are similar to those 
of humans; this propensity would have been progressively inhibited by modern science 
and substituted by rational explanations. There is undoubtedly an element of truth in 
this interpretation, but it requires clarification and qualification inasmuch as the no-
tion of anthropocentrism remains rather vague and refers to phenomena of a very dif-
ferent nature. It is such a clarification that I would like to offer in the present lecture. 
After setting forth some of the problems that anthropology faces in the treatment of 
the relations between humans and non-humans, I will show how processes of identifica-
tion could account for the humanisation of animals and plants. This will allow me to 
distinguish between two forms of anthropocentrism, one characteristic of certain non-
modern cultures, the other proper to modern cosmology.
It has been common in anthropology to subsume the material, social, and symbolic 
relations that humans entertain with their environment under the label of the relations 
of continuity and discontinuity between nature and culture, two fields of phenomena 
responding to different operative principles that anthropology has obstinately attempt-
ed, and doggedly failed, to stitch together. Now, as Father Kemlin’s anecdote suggests, 
such a distinction between an order of human reality and an order of natural reality 
is far from being universally perceived; and one may even surmise that it constitutes 
the main specificity of Western modernity. I was made aware of that by my fieldwork 
experience among the Achuar Indians of the Upper Amazon, who treat plants and 
animals as persons endowed with a soul identical to the one they possess, thus opening 
7  D. Sperber (1974) Le symbolisme en général
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the possibility of establishing social relations with them.8 Such an attitude is in no way 
exceptional. It is common elsewhere in Amazonia, but also among the Indians of Sub-
arctic Canada and the Inuit. It cannot be considered either as a specifically Amerindian 
feature, inasmuch as Siberian peoples also view their relations with game animals as a 
socially codified link between persons. This attitude, wherein humans and non-humans 
are viewed as separated by mere differences of degree, not of kind, is also common 
elsewhere, particularly in South-East Asia and Melanesia. It is not characteristic solely 
of non-literate and stateless peoples: Malamoud for ancient India or Berque for Japan 
have shown that these refined civilisations do not operate the type of stark disjunction, 
common in the West, between individuals and their environment; in both cases, the 
environment is what relates and constitutes humans as multiple expressions of an en-
compassing cosmological order.9 There is no escaping the fact that, in many parts of the 
world, many peoples have not felt compelled to proceed to this reflexive objectification 
of nature which is characteristic of Western modernity.
If one fully acknowledges this evidence, then it becomes scientifically risky to go 
on using, even as a methodological prop, a distinction between nature and culture 
which is so uncommon elsewhere. Nevertheless, this is what anthropologists of all per-
suasions have done for more than a century when they viewed non-modern cosmologies 
as differing from ours in that they incompletely objectify nature, shrouding it under a 
symbolic veil weaved by mystical minds incapable of dissociating what pertains to hu-
manity and what pertains to beings and phenomena that exist apart from human will 
and action. By so doing, anthropologists were taking for granted two implicit premises 
which seem quite objectionable. First, it implied that the sector of the world that non-
modern peoples were striving to objectify in their own way is equivalent to our nature, 
the one that the sciences have delineated and the laws of which they strive to uncover. 
Second, it meant that our own dualist cosmology represents the template according to 
which the other cosmologies should be apprehended and analysed, the features of the 
latter becoming salient because they contrast with our own.
What are the consequences of such an attitude? The dualism of nature and cul-
ture inevitably generates strategies of anthropological explanation that are congruent 
with this distinction and which gravitate around one or another of two monist poles, 
one naturalist and the other culturalist. The former asserts that culture, being a mere 
8  Ph. Descola (1994) In the society of nature: a native ecology in Amazonia (tr. N. Scott). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; Ph. Descola (1996) The spears of twilight. Life and death in the Amazon jungle (tr. J. Lloyd). London: 
Harper Collins.
9  A. Berque (1986) Le sauvage et l’artifice. Les Japonais devant la nature. Paris: Gallimard; C. Malamoud (1989) 
Cuire le monde. Rite et pensée dans l’Inde ancienne. Paris: La Découverte.
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adaptation to biological and ecological constraints, should be explained exclusively 
by the kind of mechanisms uncovered by the natural sciences; the latter surmises that 
culture constitutes an entirely distinct order of reality which entertains only contin-
gent relations with the natural environment and the requisites of human metabolism. 
In spite of this often very polemical bipolarity, the prejudices are quite similar on both 
sides as they are equally based upon the belief that everybody everywhere necessarily 
sees the world as carved out along the same dividing line. The effects of these preju-
dices can be seen operating at all stages of the anthropological enterprise, but they 
are particularly notable when they shape the definition of the type of knowledge that 
anthropology produces. For the dualism of nature and culture that Western ethnogra-
phers bring unwillingly with them in their intellectual equipment will result in their 
perceiving the local system of objectification of reality that they study as a more or less 
impoverished variant of their own. Now, none of the various strategies that anthropol-
ogy has adopted to account for these discrepancies between modern and non-modern 
cosmologies is really satisfying. A first approach, self-dubbed materialist, distinguishes 
between a core of efficient knowledge and practices and the fog of beliefs through which 
peoples dissimulate to themselves the real conditions of their collective existence; as 
their ideas and beliefs are seen as phantasmagorical reflections of objective practices, in 
other words as ideology, the connection between the real and the imaginary is doomed 
to remain forever mysterious.10
Another, more charitable approach envisions the cosmologies of non-modern peo-
ples as systems of explanation of nature, erroneous indeed in view of what modern sci-
ences have taught us, but nevertheless bearing witness to a real desire to give sense and 
meaning to the world by detecting in it relations of causality. In this intellectualist per-
spective, magical action is but the practical translation of a system of representations 
dealing with the nature of the physical world, a means to exploit certain properties of 
the latter so as to exert a control on it.11 However, by asserting an initial distinction 
between, on the one hand, objective knowledge and practices, and, on the other hand, 
beliefs and magical agency, such an approach again leads to treating this part of the 
objectification of reality that non-modern peoples would have been unable to complete 
as a clumsy prefiguration of the one that we, in the West, have achieved.
10  This refers to all brands of what was formerly called “vulgar materialism”, whether of Marxist Inclination 
-for instance, C. Meillassoux (1975) Femmes, greniers et capitaux. Paris: François Maspero- or belonging to the school of 
“cultural ecology” -for instance, M. Harris (1974) Cows, pigs, wars and witches: the riddles of culture. New York: Random 
House.
11  See, for instance, Frazer, who was followed on that point by some of the great names of British functionalist 
anthropology: Frazer, J. G. (1922) The golden bough. A study in magic and religion. Abridged edition. London: Macmillan.
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Still another approach is associated with the name of Durkheim.12 While the in-
tellectualist approach emphasises the cosmocentric dimension of the representations 
of nature, Durkheim and those who favour a symbolic interpretation underscore the 
sociocentric aspect of these representations: they bear less upon cosmological proper-
ties than upon relations between humans; they signify and express a certain state of the 
moral community rather than providing a conceptual frame for the magical actions 
by the means of which a degree of control over the physical world is attempted. Here 
again, the representations of the material domain are mere reflections, supposedly faith-
ful indexes of the properties of the institutions which serve as their templates, rather 
than false images of reputedly objective practices and phenomena as in the previous 
approach.
Finally, certain branches of cognitive anthropology treat anthropocentrism in a 
very different perspective. Pascal Boyer, for instance, rejects the idea that the attribu-
tion of human qualities to non-humans would be the product of a spontaneous ten-
dency of human nature.13 He draws on studies in developmental psychology which 
tend to show that very young children can make distinctions in their environment 
between different kinds of objects according to the specific features that these objects 
exhibit as members of ontological categories such as “person”, “artifact”, or “natural 
kind”. Anthropocentric projection would not be intuitive and natural, but counter-
intuitive –that is conflicting with innate ontological principles– and cultural –that is 
acquired in a given social context. And it would be this counter-intuitive dimension of 
certain representations which would explain their stability: as it goes against expecta-
tions the idea of a tiger passing a covenant with a human would be more salient and 
easier to memorise than the information pertaining to the animal’s ordinary behaviour. 
For a Western anthropologist perhaps, but not for a Reungao who has been familiar 
with such ideas since early childhood, i.e. at a time when the representation of the tiger 
as a living kind would not yet be cognitively stabilised as an ontological category, and 
thus could not appear as counter-intuitive. Also, this hypothesis does not explain why 
tigers who talk would be more acceptable to the Reungao than to astrophysicists. If 
anthropocentric projections respond to a universal counter-intuitive mechanism, then 
why would they be so efficiently inhibited among modern Westerners? Ascribing this 
responsibility to scientific training seems highly optimistic.
12  E. Durkheim (1960 [1912]) Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. Le système totémique en Australie. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France. Or E. Durkheim and M. Mauss (1903) « De quelques formes primitives de classifica-
tion. Contribution à l’étude des représentations collectives », Année sociologique 6, pp. 1–72.
13  P. Boyer (1996) “What makes anthropomorphism natural: intuitive ontology and cultural representations”, 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 2, pp. 83–97.
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Furthermore, the multiple and intricate links that all humans permanently weave 
with their environment do not allow such clear cut distinctions between practical 
knowledge and symbolic representations, whether intuitive or counter-intuitive. As a 
Reungao may treat a tiger in “animal code” –for instance, if he has to protect his herd 
of buffaloes from it– in the same way an astrophysicist may occasionally treat his cat 
in “human code”, by non-reflexively ascribing to it a form of intentionality, or even a 
capacity to represent the mental states of his human companion. Rather than viewing 
the cosmologies of non-modern peoples as false beliefs and anthropocentric projections, 
geared more or less convincingly to chunks of positive knowledge, it is preferable to 
treat them, like all our actions in the world, as a way of patterning our relations with 
all kinds of entities in which we discern specific qualities, entities that require in return 
forms of behaviour and mediation that are adequate to the nature we ascribe to them. 
Saying this does not amount to a relativist proclamation, since relativism becomes 
possible only when it is placed in juxtaposition to a universal natural order against 
the background of which the bewildering diversity of cultural formulae stands vividly 
delineated. If you suppress this grandiose background of nature, without for that de-
nying the existence of that portion of the world which it has received the mission to 
represent, the motives of the foreground become rearranged in a new landscape wherein 
nature and society, humans and non-humans, individuals and collectives do not appear 
before us as distributed between substances, processes, and representations, but as the 
instituted expressions of relations between multiple entities whose ontological status 
and degree of agency vary according to the positions they occupy one regarding the 
other. In sum, it is not enough to show that the opposition between nature and culture 
is meaningless for non-modern societies, or that it emerges lately in the course of the 
history of the West; it must be integrated to a new analytical framework within which 
modern naturalism, far from constituting the template which allows to gauge cultures 
that are distant from ours in space and time, would be but one of the possible expres-
sions of more general schemes regulating the objectification of self and non-self.
Among these schemes, one appears to play a major role in the way we perceive non-
humans, a process I call “identification”. It results from the fact that humans arrive in 
the world equipped with a certain kind of body and with a theory of mind, i.e. endowed 
with a specific biological complex of forms, functions, and substances, on the one hand, 
and with a capacity to attribute to others mental states identical to their own, on the 
other hand. This equipment allows us to proceed to identifications in the sense that it 
provides the elementary mechanism for recognising differences and similarities between 
self and other worldly objects, by inferring analogies and distinctions of appearances, 
behaviour and qualities between what I surmise I am and what I surmise the others are. 
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In other words, the ontological status of the objects in my environment depends upon 
my capacity to posit or not, with regard to an indeterminate alter, an interiority and a 
physicality analogous to the ones I believe I am endowed with. I take interiority here 
in a deliberately vague sense that, according to the context, will refer to the attributes 
ordinarily associated with the soul, the mind, or consciousness – intentionality, subjec-
tivity, reflexivity, the aptitude to dream – or to more abstract characteristics such as the 
idea that I share with an alter a same essence or origin. Physicality, by contrast, refers to 
form, substance, physiological, perceptual, sensory-motor, and proprioceptive processes, 
or even temperament as an expression of the influence of bodily humours.
Whatever the diversity of the conceptions of the person that anthropologists have 
encountered, it seems that this duality of physicality and interiority is universally pre-
sent, although with an infinite variety of modalities of connection and interaction be-
tween the two planes; for there is no case that I know of, before the modern materialist 
theories of consciousness, of a conception of the ordinary living human person which 
would be based on pure interiority – let’s call it a mind without a body – or on pure 
physicality – a body without a mind. The distinction between interiority and physical-
ity is not the simple ethnocentric projection of an opposition between body and mind 
that would be specific to the West; one should rather apprehend this opposition as it 
emerged in Europe, and the philosophical and theological theories which were elabo-
rated upon it, as local variants of a more general system of elementary contrasts that 
can be studied comparatively.
For the identifications based on the combination of interiority and physicality are 
quite limited: when confronted with an alter, whether human or non-human, I can 
either surmise that this object possesses elements of physicality and interiority analo-
gous to mine; or that his interiority and his physicality are entirely distinct from mine; 
or that we have similar interiorities and different physical embodiments; or that our 
interiorities are discontinuous and our physicalities continuous.14 These combinations 
define four major types of ontologies, that is four modes of inferring qualities among 
existents, each of which constrains a way to perceive the essence of humanity and its 
limits. I will dwell in this lecture on two of these ontologies only, since their contrasted 
features permit to throw a light on the nature of anthropocentrism: in one humans and 
non-humans are seen as possessing identical interiorities and different physicalities, 
and I call it “animism”; the other postulates the reverse, and I call it “naturalism”.
14  For a detailed analysis of the four modes of identification, see Ph. Descola (2005) Par-delà nature et culture. 
Paris: Gallimard. For a synthesis in English, Ph. Descola (2006) “Beyond nature and culture: the 2005 Radcliffe-Brown 
Lecture in Social Anthropology”, Proceedings of the British Academy, pp. 137-55.
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Animism
Like the Reungao, the Wari’ or the Achuar, a number of peoples in North and 
South America, in Siberia, and in South-East Asia endow plants, animals, and 
other elements of their physical environment with a subjectivity of their own; and 
they maintain with these entities all sorts of person to person relations: relations 
of friendship, of exchange, of seduction, or of hostility. In these “animic” systems, 
humans and non-humans are conceived as possessing the same type of interiority 
and it is because of this common internal disposition that non-humans are said to 
possess social characteristics: they respect kinship rules, they obey ethical codes, 
they engage in ritual activity. However, the reference shared by most beings in the 
world is humanity as a general condition, not Homo sapiens as a species. In other 
words, humans and all the kinds of non humans with whom humans interact have 
each a different kind of physicality in that their identical internal essences are 
lodged in different types of bodies, which are often described locally as clothing 
that can be donned or discarded, the better to underline their autonomy from 
the interiorities which inhabit them. Now, as Viveiros de Castro pointed out in 
the case of Amazonia, the specific clothing induces contrasted perspectives on 
the world, in that the physiological and perceptual constraints proper to a type 
of body impose to each class of being a specific position and point of view in the 
general ecology of relations.15 Human and non-human persons have an integrally 
cultural view of their life sphere because they share the same kind of interiority, 
but the world that they apprehend and use is different, for their bodily equipment 
is distinct. The place that each species occupies in the trophic chain is precisely 
determined by its organic equipment, since this conditions both the milieu acces-
sible to the species and, through the organs of locomotion and of acquisition of 
food, the type of resources that can be tapped in this milieu.
The form of bodies thus amounts to a bundle of differentiated functions; it is 
the entire biological toolkit that allows a species to occupy a certain habitat and 
to lead there the type of distinctive lifestyle by which it is identified. Although 
many species share a similar interiority, each one of them thus possesses its own 
physicality under the guise of a particular ethogram which will determine its own 
Umwelt, in the sense of Jakob von Uexküll, that is, the salient features of its en-
vironment are those that are geared to its specific bodily tools. What Kaj Århem 
15  E. Viveiros de Castro (1996) “Os pronomes cosmológicos e o perspectivismo ameríndio”, Mana 2 (2), pp. 
115–144.
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writes of the Makuna Indians may be generalised to most animic collectives: 
“animal communities are organised according to the same principles as human 
societies, (. . .) each (. . .) animal community is said to possess its own “culture”, 
its knowledge, its customs and its material goods by the means of which it sub-
sists as a distinct class of beings”.16 Thus in an animic regime, there is no absolute 
continuity between humans and non-humans since each class of beings (including 
humans) form a distinct collective, wholly “cultural” indeed, but characterized by 
cultural features which vary according to bodily dispositions. Neither can one talk 
here of anthropocentrism in the strict sense of the term, as the various species of 
nonhumans are differentiated from humans by their form.
In these conditions, how is it possible to pass a covenant with a tiger? Through 
a temporary change of form. A classic feature of most animic ontologies is the 
capacity of metamorphosis attributed to beings who have a similar interiority: 
a human can take the shape of an animal; an animal can adopt the appearance of 
another animal; a plant or an animal can discard its bodily clothing to unveil its 
soul objectified in a human body. Generally ascertained in dreams, as in Father 
Kemlin’s anecdote, metamorphosis offers an ingenious solution to the problem 
of the interaction on the same plane between human and non-human, initially 
possessing entirely different bodies. It has often been remarked that these interac-
tions take as model the systems of attitudes and the institutions that are typical of 
human societies. But this does not amount to a metaphorical projection of human 
society on non-humans, since that process would imply that a neat distinction 
is made between what belongs to nature and what belongs to society. In animic 
collectives a realm of nature cannot be dissociated from a realm of society so as 
to allow the projection of the latter upon the former as an organizing principle; 
what obtains is a unique field of relations between a multitude of humans and 
non-humans of various kinds.17 This is why social categories, in particular kinship 
categories, are mere labels designating a type of binding whatever the ontological 
status of the elements it links. This function stems from the fact that the relations 
between humans are always named and codified, thus providing encompassing 
schemes that are easier to manipulate, easier to memorise and easier to mobilise 
for a polyvalent usage than the relations that can be detected among non-humans.
16  Kaj Århem (1996) “The cosmic food web: human–nature relatedness in the Northwest Amazon”, in Ph. 
Descola and G. Pálsson (eds.), Nature and society: anthropological perspectives, London: Routledge, pp. 185–204.
17  See the excellent critique of metaphorical projection by T. Ingold (1996) “Hunting and gathering as ways of 
perceiving the environment”, in R. Ellen and K. Fukui (eds.), Redefining nature. Ecology, culture and domestication, Oxford: 
Berg, pp. 117–155.
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Naturalism
I will not dwell on the definition of naturalism, so familiar to us is the state of 
the world that it qualifies. For naturalism is not only the idea that nature exists, that 
certain entities owe their existence and development to a principle which is extraneous 
both to chance and to the effects of human will; it does not qualify only the advent, 
conventionally situated in the 17th century, of a specific ontological domain, a place of 
order and necessity where nothing happens without a cause. Naturalism also implies 
a counterpart to Nature, a world of artifice and free-will, the complexity of which has 
progressively emerged under the scrutiny of analysts, until it rendered necessary, in the 
course of the 19th century, the institution of special sciences. These were given the task 
of stabilising the boundaries of this new field of study and of defining its characteris-
tics, to wit the diversity of expressions of the creativity of humans as producers of signs, 
of norms, and of wealth. If one considers naturalism – that is the coexistence between 
a single unifying nature and a multiplicity of cultures– not as the all-embracing tem-
plate which permits the objectification of any reality, but as one among several other 
modes of identification, then its contrastive properties appear much more starkly.
First, it becomes clear that naturalism inverts the ontological premises of animism 
since, instead of claiming an identity of souls and a difference of bodies, it is predi-
cated upon a discontinuity of interiorities and a material continuity.18 What, for us, 
distinguishes humans from non-humans is the mind, the soul, subjectivity, a moral 
conscience, language, and so forth, in the same way as human groups are distinguished 
from one another by a collective internal disposition that used to be called Volksgeist, 
but is more familiar to us now under its modern label of “culture”. On the other hand, 
we, run of the mill naturalists, are aware at least since Descartes, and especially so since 
Darwin, that the physical dimension of humans locates them within a material con-
tinuum wherein they do not stand out as singularities. Although this desecration of hu-
mankind may still appear shocking to some, naturalism has rendered almost common 
sense the idea that the molecular structure and the metabolism that we have inherited 
from our phylogeny makes us no different from the most humble bugs, and that the 
laws of thermodynamics and chemistry apply as much to us as to inorganic objects. 
Or, to quote Flaubert, we must come to terms, as did Bouvard and Pécuchet, with the 
evidence that our body contains “phosphorus like matches, albumen like egg whites, 
and hydrogen gas like street-lamps”.
18  As E. Viveiros de Castro pointed out in A inconstância da alma selvagem, e outros ensaios de
antropologia (2002), Säo Paulo: Cosac & Naify, pp. 375–376.
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In the cosmological organisation shaped by naturalism, humans are distributed 
within neatly differentiated collectives, cultures, or societies, which exclude de jure not 
only the whole compound of non-humans, but also, not so long ago, exotic or marginal 
humans whose enigmatic mores, and the lack of spirituality or moral elevation of which 
these were the symptoms, led to their being assigned to the natural domain. The onto-
logical discrimination excluding non-human organisms that are biologically very close 
to us is a sign of the clear privilege granted in our own mode of identification to criteria 
based on the expression of a purported interiority (whether language, self-consciousness, 
or theory of mind) rather than those based on material continuity. The principles which 
govern such a cosmology are so simple that we tend wrongly to take them as universal: 
the frontier and the properties of the human collectives are derived from the fundamen-
tal division that we trace between human and non-humans.
In that sense, if animism and naturalism both take human society as general models 
of collectives, they do it very differently. Animism is quite liberal in its attribution of so-
ciality to non-humans, while naturalism reserves the privilege of sociality to everything 
which is not deemed natural. In the case of animism, conventional anthropology would 
say that nature is conceived by analogy with culture, since the majority of beings in the 
world reputedly live in a cultural regime, and it is mainly through physical attributes – 
the morphology of bodies and the behaviour associated with it – that collectives are dis-
tinguished from one another. In naturalism, by contrast, common anthropological wis-
dom has it that culture is conceived as what is differentiated from nature; it is qualified 
by default. Although both conceptions may appear anthropocentric, only naturalism is 
really so, since non-humans are defined tautologically by their lack of humanity and it 
is only in humans that resides the paradigm of moral dignity denied to other beings. 
No such thing can be said of animism since non-humans share the same condition as 
that of humans, the latter claiming as their only privilege the ascription to non-humans 
of institutions that are similar to their own in order to be able to establish with them 
relations that are based on shared norms of behaviour. Animism is thus better defined as 
anthropogenic, in that it contents itself with deriving from humans only what is neces-
sary in order for non-humans to be treated like humans.
Since its inception, however, the anthropocentrism proper to modern naturalism 
stumbles upon a paradox as to the true place of humans in the animal kingdom: now the 
animal is seen as the smallest common denominator of a universal figure of humankind, 
now as the perfect foil by which to define humankind by contrast. Confronted with the 
combined evidence of physical similarities between human and non-human animals, on 
the one hand, and of dissimilarities in their dispositions and aptitudes, on the other, a 
naturalist ontology has few choices: either it underscores the connection between humans 
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and animals through their biological attributes, or it relegates this physical continuity 
to the background and emphasises the exceptionality of the inner qualities by which hu-
mans would rise above the other existents. For a long time the second attitude prevailed 
in the West when it came to define the essence of humankind. For, as Tim Ingold rightly 
points out, philosophers seldom ask themselves “what makes humans animals of a par-
ticular kind?” and prefer the typical naturalist question “what is the generic difference 
between man and animal?”19 In the first question, humankind is a particular form of ani-
mality defined by membership of the Homo sapiens species, while in the second question 
it becomes an exclusive state, a self-referential principle, a moral condition.
Hence the problem posed by an exact understanding of this ancient Western oxy-
moron: human nature. Is it possible for beings that are seen as divided, partaking of 
animality by their flesh and their bodily appetites and of divinity or transcendental 
principles by their moral condition, to possess a nature of their own? Should we see in 
this hypothetical human nature the endpoint of a repertory of faculties and behaviour 
equally present, and more easily observable, among non-human animals, this being the 
true nature of our species, guaranteed by the singularity of our genome? Or shall we see 
it, as social anthropologists usually do, as a predisposition to overcome our animality, de-
fined by a capacity to generate endless cultural variations unscathed by genetic determi-
nations? The first approach, which emphasizes interspecific continuities in physicality, 
fails to account convincingly for the intraspecific continuities in the public expression of 
interiority, i.e. for what we call cultural differences; the second approach, which views 
anthropos by contrast with animals, to wit as an inventor of differences, tends to forget 
that he is also a Homo sapiens, i.e. a particular kind of organism.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that our naturalist ontology has evolved in the last decades thanks 
to new inputs from scientific research. Scientists are now less prone to assert a neat dis-
continuity of interiorities between humans and non-humans, although they still disagree 
as to the range of differences that separate us from certain animals in that respect. Some 
ethologists have gone very far in the direction of continuity. Donald Griffin, for instance, 
attributes reflexive and conscious thought to some animals, based on observations of their 
19  T. Ingold (1994) “Humanity and animality”, in T. Ingold (ed.) Companion encyclopedia of anthropology: human-
ity, culture and social life, London: Routledge, pp. 14–32. Fortunately there are notable exceptions, such as J. Proust, who 
sets forth the minimal requirements that a structure must respond to so as to constitute a mind, whatever its physical 
support: J. Proust (1997) Comment l’esprit vient aux bêtes. Essai sur la representation. Paris: Gallimard.
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behaviour which seemingly attest to a true planification of their actions, implying an 
internal representation of the aims to achieve.20 He also argues that human language, in 
spite of its unparalleled adaptability, is not really different from the systems of communi-
cation that are used by apes or by some birds, and that it is therefore legitimate to consider 
these modes of exchange of information as proper languages. Griffin is not very far from 
Condillac when, on the apparently sounder basis provided by evolutionary biology and 
cognitive ethology, he advocates a continuity of mental faculties between humans and 
animals and dismisses as an anthropocentric prejudice foreign to the scientific method the 
idea of a difference of nature between the former and the latter.21
Such views are far from being unanimously accepted by ethologists. Nevertheless, one 
of their merits is to draw our attention to the conflicts of interpretation typical of a natural-
ist ontology when it is confronted with possible counter-evidence. One of these conflicts, 
which has been raging in anthropology for some time, is that opposing two kinds of 
monism, the culturalist one and the naturalist one. The controversy has now taken a quasi 
tragic turn as a result of the prejudices that both parties harbour towards each other and 
of the ignorance that they boast of the results that their opponents have attained. For, by 
postulating simple differences of degree between the cognitive abilities of certain animals 
and those of humans, advocates of continuity always take as the comparative standard of 
the evolutionary process the figure of humankind that they know best, that is the modern 
Western adult (usually an undergraduate student in psychology). And while no scientist 
would now dare to maintain that so-called primitive peoples are an intermediate stage 
between great apes and us, one is still troubled by the interest that contemporary evolu-
tionary psychologists show for the mental functions of present-day populations of hunter-
gatherers, implicitly likened to ancient humans from the Pleistocene, and thus seemingly 
closer to apes than a professor from Stanford.22
Cognitive differences between human and non-human animals are indeed of degree, 
not of kind, when they are taken in the long time-span of evolution. And this is an entirely 
legitimate position, provided one does not yield to this pernicious form of ethnocentrism 
which consists of extending the scale of biological gradations to within Homo sapiens sa-
piens, by looking for contemporary ethnographic examples in the Kalahari, in the Boreal 
20  D. P. Griffin (1991) “Progress towards a cognitive ethology”, in C. A. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive ethology. The 
minds of other animals, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 3–17.
21  D. P. Griffin (1976) The question of animal awareness: evolutionary continuity of mental experience. New York: 
Rockfeller University Press.
22  For instance, L Cosmides and J. Tooby (1994) “Origins of domain specificity: the evolution of functional 
organization”, in L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman (eds.), Mapping the mind. Domainn specificity in cognition and culture. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Or advocates of the “optimal foraging theory”, such as H. Kaplan and K. Hill 
(1985) “Food sharing among Ache foragers: tests of explanatory hypotheses”, Current Anthropology 26, pp. 223–239.
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forest, or in Amazonia, which would illustrate a hypothetical bio-behavioural stage of 
cognitive evolution as yet uncontaminated by an excess of culture. The rather crude as-
sumption behind such uses of ethnography is that where ideas, values, and conventions are 
simple and few in numbers, it should be easier to understand how behaviour and choices 
are dictated by natural selection. Ethnologists justly criticise such prejudices, pointing to 
the fact that contemporary hunter-gatherers have experienced many millennia of historical 
transformations and that they should not as a consequence be treated as fossil witnesses of 
the first stages of hominisation. But while doing so, ethnologists often fall into the other 
dogma of naturalism, constitutive of their field of study, that of the absolute singularity of 
humankind, the only species capable of internal self-differentiation by the means of cul-
ture. In other words, while the anthropocentrism of ethnologists leads them to neglect the 
physical continuity between humans and other organisms (and to conveniently forget that 
some animal species have “culture”, in the sense of non-biologically transmitted features 
of behaviour), the acknowledgement of this physical continuity by modern gradualists 
prevents them from apprehending the discontinuity of interiorities, except as an external 
variable labelled “culture”, whose incidence on cognitive abilities would be easier to evalu-
ate among the less modern humans. It is not the lesser paradox of this impossible dialogue 
that those who claim a scientific approach grounded in the theory of evolution come to 
neglect all historical dimension in the life of humankind, and prefer to borrow from their 
foes a very recent and highly Eurocentric concept, that of culture, whose relevance anthro-
pologists, less relativist than one might think, have been contesting for some time.
However, nobody seems aware of that apart from us, anthropologists, because nobody 
reads us anymore. While we gorge ourselves with trivial ethnographic particulars, while 
we muddle in self-indulgent introspection, while we studiously refrain from dabbling 
with the master narratives of the past, the new “sciences of culture” have gained a wide 
readership, however crude their naturalistic approaches, by dealing with the important 
issues that we have failed to address for too long and which have made famous for the lay-
man the names of great anthropologists of the 19th and 20th centuries, from Tylor to Lévi-
Strauss. So, as a concluding remark, let me risk an exhortation: let’s be bolder and confront 
the subject matter of our science, human nature, not by looking at universals as biologists 
and psychologists do, not by dissecting thought experiments or a Western notion of the 
subject, as philosophers do, nor by treating peoples’ lives and achievements as texts, as 
literary critics do, but by trying to render systematically intelligible the multiple ways in 
which we, a specific kind of organism, engage with the world, acquire a representation of 
it, and contribute to modifying it by weaving with humans and non-humans constant or 
occasional links of a remarkable, but not infinite, diversity.
